

UN FLYING

THE WORLD

UNIFYING THE WORLD

By

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CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I MODERN METHODS OF COMMUNICATION	9
II COMMUNICATIONS, NATIONAL AND INTER- NATIONAL - - - - -	37
III EFFECTS OF WAR AND COMMERCE ON COMMUNICATIONS - - -	52
IV INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND COM- MUNICATIONS - - - -	82

FOREWORD BY THE EDITOR

THE object of this series is twofold ; to disseminate knowledge of the facts of international relations, and to inculcate the international rather than the nationalistic way of regarding them. This latter purpose implies no distortion of facts. It is hoped that the books will be found to maintain a high standard of accuracy and fairness.

But their avowed object is not merely to record facts, but to present them in a certain light, and with a certain object. That light is Internationalism and that object the peace of the world. If the series is successful in its purpose it will contribute to what Wells has called the " international mind."

The object has been to produce the books at a price that shall not be prohibitive to people of small incomes. For the world cannot be saved by governments and governing classes. It can be saved only by the creation, among the peoples of the world, of such a public opinion as cannot be duped by isrepresentation nor misled by passion. The difficulties of that achievement can hardly be exaggerated, but ought not to daunt. And the editor ventures to hope for support for men of good will in this one attempt, among the many others, to enlighten the intelligence and direct the will.

CHAPTER I

MODERN METHODS OF COMMUNICATION

(THE events of the past few years have made all thinking men aware that our civilisation needs, for its maintenance, an elaborate system of transport and communications.) Before the war we all felt vaguely proud of our triumphs over space, and we felt our superiority over our forefathers who could not command, as we could, the commodities and the riches of all the ends of the earth. When the war began, some of our means of transport were needed for movements of men and munitions, so that civilian requirements were a little less adequately met and there began to be delays, overcrowdings, shortages in the ordinary services. The longer it lasted, the worse these deprivations became. One of the two opposing groups of powers closed the seas to the navigation of its enemies, and these enemies desperately responded by attempting, with fair means or foul,

to destroy all shipping that carried the necessities of life to their opponents. As the struggle became more intense, a greater and greater proportion of the productive activity of all countries went to make specialised instruments of warfare, things quickly consumed and of little use for peaceful living. Waste and destruction made havoc among all the apparatus of carrying goods in all the theatres of war, so that, when the cessation of hostilities came about, the weaker belligerents found themselves not only impoverished and stricken with famine and pestilence, but also lacking what was needed for bringing to their doors the means of healing and recovery, even if they could have bought them, and even if they had existed in the measure that was needed. Opinions differ as to the relative importance of different elements in the economic and moral breakdown of the greater part of Europe, but no one denies a great share in it to the lack of transport. There has been a complete practical demonstration of the fact that transport plays a vital part in the organisation of the modern world.

Theoretically, of course, the fact was plain enough before. Systems of communication have always formed a part of the world's accumulated

capital, a part of those possessions which are used for the creation of further wealth and for the conduct of current business, and every prospering community has always put some of its winnings into this kind of investment. To go back to almost primitive times, a great step forward in the progress of agriculture was marked when men began to make roads or boats. Cultivation had been successful; more food was produced than the cultivators needed for themselves, and so a part of it could be handed over to men who, instead of working in the fields, should make highways and carry the produce over them to barter it elsewhere. It became worth while to get from the ground a still greater surplus, in order to sell it to men of other pursuits who could provide new luxuries or conveniences to the tillers of the soil, tools of metal or works of art. The miner, the smith and the potter found a new market and a new stimulus to the production of a surplus, just as the agriculturalists had done, and the whole new community which had been brought together by these links, set out towards greater activity and greater wealth. Over and over again in the course of history has this process been repeated and extended. A full historical atlas would have to

include, not only maps to show how the frontiers of the different empires and their sub-divisions have advanced and receded in each period ; but also maps of their systems of roads and the routes they used by river and sea. These maps would show, in all the ages of order and economic progress, a gradually thickening network of lines. There would be other periods of decay, such as that through which we have passed and are still passing, when roads are obliterated and harbours deserted, but our own age would differ from the others only in the intricacy of the system, the closeness and the great carrying capacity of the routes. It would be a difference merely of degree and not of kind.

At the same time this difference is so great that it marks off the history of the world's communications into two great eras. The first, many thousands of years in duration, is marked by steady, if interrupted, progress, starting with walking on foot and carrying by hand, leading on to beasts of burden and traction, wheeled vehicles and ocean-going ships with the mariners' compass. The second begins with the industrial revolution and has lasted barely a century : it is a period in

which countless mechanical inventions applied to transport have made it progress with bewildering speed. In the year 1834 Sir Robert Peel was summoned from Italy to England on urgent affairs of state, and it was remarked that, travelling post-haste, he covered the journey in no shorter time than an old Roman emperor. The steam locomotive engine is a recent invention ; it is less than a century since George Stephenson began to use it on the Stockton and Darlington railway. The growth of the railway system of the world was amazingly rapid. In America it began almost as soon as in England. By 1869 a line had been completed from the Atlantic to the Pacific, nearly two thousand miles in length, and running, for the most part, through uninhabited country. Other trans-continental lines followed it, but they were shorter than the great Siberian railway, which was finally completed in 1904. In the meantime the older countries were getting more and more railways ; at the present time the mileage in the United Kingdom is nearer twenty-four thousand than twenty-three. The total length of the railways of the world in 1913 was estimated at 670,000 miles ; in 1919 at no less than 721,000. Some parts of the world, above all China, have a very

small proportion of this development, and in none has a point been reached when it is no longer profitable to add to the existing railway system. The continual progress of railways illustrates a principle which frequently appears in the growth of communications: the development of a new method very rarely if ever supersedes the old. At the most, it relegates it to a more narrow sphere of work. The railway has survived the rise of the motor-car just as the horse has survived the rise of the railway.

The steamship came before the railway: in 1815 the first steamer began to ply between Liverpool and Glasgow. In the twenties and thirties rapid progress was made in the setting-up of steamship companies for international voyages. At a very rough estimate, the total gross tonnage of the steamships over 100 tons burthen was put for 1913 at forty-three millions. For 1919, with the addition of motor-boats, which had increased in importance in the interval, it was put at forty-eight millions. The innumerable small craft are not counted here, nor are the sailing ships which have survived the later invention. Including these, the gross tonnage of the world's shipping is more than fifty millions. This enormous carrying-power

is still fast increasing, and, given peace and prosperity, will still increase much more. It is in a sense the keystone in the arch of the system of trade and manufacture by which the world is fed and furnished.

While the railways and steamships were being built much was done to increase and improve the older means of communication. Scientific road-making had entered on a new stage at the beginning of the nineteenth century, with Macadam and Telford. Considerable improvements have been made in it since then; the steam-roller, for instance, has done much for roads. In England the navigation of rivers and canals has of late been scandalously allowed to go down, in order that railways might profit by their decline, but in many countries the steam barge or tug and the steam dredger have added hugely to the utility of the waterways. Slow as these are, they have still great advantages of cheapness over the railways, and the industrial revolution used them and extended them as it did all the other highways of traffic. The great ship-canals are, of course, features of the highest importance in general geography: the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal are the greatest, but there are many others which, like those of

Kiel and Corinth, have made notable changes. They belong, like the railways, to the age of steam-driven machinery, and they would scarcely have been possible in any other.

The age of steam was remarkable for the multiplicity of the machines, each of which, when it was found out, led on to modifications of the others and plans for still further innovations. It would take some little research by a skilled engineer to show all the steps towards greater precision in manufacture which prepared the way for the internal combustion engine. The nineteenth century was almost ended before they had all been taken. The first motor-cars driven by exploding vapour were those of Mr. Butler in England and Gottlieb Daimler in France in the middle of the eighties. For some years in England

motor-cars were practically prohibited by the survival of laws which limited their speed to four miles an hour, but in France and other countries they made progress. In the late nineties the motor industry began to gather in capital and importance, but it was not until well on in the twentieth century that motor vehicles became a regular means of carrying and a rival, both for goods and passengers, to the railway. While

they were reaching this position, the internal combustion engine was being experimentally applied to the proverbially impossible task of flying.

In the year 1908 M. Farman and Mr. Wilbur Wright began to fly their biplanes. The next dozen years, which bring us down to the present day, have seen one record beaten after another, until the capacity for astonishment is exhausted. In 1910 Gabriele d'Annunzio could think of no more hyperbolic climax for a story than to make the hero fly from Italy to Sardinia ; in 1919 two British officers flew straight across the Atlantic from America to Ireland. In less than sixteen hours, they traversed eighteen hundred and eighty miles of sea. Altogether the Atlantic was crossed four times in that year by aircraft, once directly and once in stages by aeroplanes, twice, westward and eastward, by an airship. The same year saw preliminary arrangements and regulations made for civil and commercial flying in England, and the peace conference of Paris made some international provisions of the same kind. Regular international air services were started, and great efforts were made to encourage the use of aeroplanes for practical purposes. Business men and experts

in the technical problems of flying hold differing opinions about the prospects of "civil aviation," but so much has been done in so short a time that it would be very rash to set any limits to them. A recent newspaper report gives an account of the point reached in America: "About a hundred business men, scattered throughout the States, now fly more or less regularly in aeroplanes between their homes in the country, at the mountains, or the shore, to their city offices. The number of itinerant 'aerial taxi' drivers who carry passengers on short (but remunerative) flights is placed at three hundred." Allowing for a little exaggeration, and bearing it in mind that "remunerative" probably means remunerative to the driver rather than to the passenger, one would not be inclined to think that this meant very much. Nothing is said about goods. The gain of time in travelling by aeroplane is, however, so great that there is a strong incentive to make it practically useful. By land a journey is much shortened, by sea it is reduced to a small fraction of the old time. The proportionate difference at sea is greater than that between the sailing-ship and the turbine steamer, though on land it is not perhaps so great as that between the stage-coach and the express train.

A lack of certainty and a limited power of carrying weights are difficulties which will most likely be overcome.

The first result of all these changes is that carrying has become far quicker than it was before.

In 1874 Jules Verne published his amusing novel in which, by what was then a bold stretching of the possibilities, the hero raced round the world in eighty days. Already, before the war, in the days when the trans-Siberian railway was running, this record had been handsomely beaten, and it is safe to foretell that, when the suitable routes for aeroplanes are no longer closed by human disturbances, it will be regarded as comically slow. The opening-up of distant countries has been going on apace for two generations, but the rise of new inventions of transport, so far from rendering the older methods obsolete, has merely set them free for other uses. The quantity of traffic has increased at least as remarkably as its speed and in the distances it covers. The old countries have been developed no less than the new, and the most profound results of the change are to be sought in these old countries rather than in those which are new and simple. No great trunk

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these changes
in daily life.

line is so complicated as the railway system of greater London. Recent experience has given much the same object lesson of what London's communications mean as it has given in the case of the system of Europe. The indescribably various daily movements of the population, by train, 'bus, tube or taxicab, between its suburbs, residential districts, centres of amusement, cemeteries, shopping streets and business quarters, must go on if that unequalled concentration of men in one place and specialisation of their work between different functions is to continue for a month. Royal commissions and Government departments have had their forebodings, cranks have had their schemes of reform, but the demand for transport has become greater and yet greater, the supply at times lagging far enough behind it to cause public inconvenience. Not only in the cities and towns has the aspect of daily life been changed for a great part of the inhabitants ; even in secluded rural places the same changes are at work. The motor-'bus has abolished the distance between many isolated villages and their market-towns ; some of those which are farthest from the railway have been brought within reach of the cinema and the skating. A Minister of Transport,

recently appointed to order these things for the general good, wrote a glowing prediction of the times when every worker in a factory would live far away from its noise and smoke with his own kitchen garden and hen-run. A complementary change is also conceivable in which the problem of dulness in village life would be solved by the simple expedient of housing all the agricultural labourers in towns. It will be some time before either of these becomes a general rule, but they are symbols of many changes, penetrating into every department of existence and affecting untold millions of men, which the modern development of communications has already brought about.

In considering the function of these communications, one must not limit the field too closely.

Although it is very easy to get into the way of regarding transport as mainly concerned with moving things about from one place to another, it is very dangerous to forget that, all the time, it is also passing round ideas from the mind of one man to the mind of another. The same engine that pulls trucks full of horses or coal has also mail-bags and books and pictures behind it, or human beings, who may be

the missionaries of new ideas or new knowledge. Almost any material object may bring new enlightenment with it; its manufacture may be imitated, as the coins of the Romans were imitated by the ancient Britons, or, unable to imitate it, the people who receive it may learn from its complexity or beauty the weakness of their own civilisation, as the people of the Middle Ages learnt from the rediscovered masterpieces of classical times. But these effects do not necessarily come from seeing and handling works of superior art. Millions of African and Asiatic natives have possessed the products of European ingenuity without being stimulated to make like things for themselves. The stimulus is far more likely to come from the stronger and more direct influence of precept than from dumb example. When a mediæval king wanted to introduce a new industrial process into his country, it was not sufficient to bring in specimens of the finished product and to invite his own craftsmen to copy it. The best way of setting about it was to offer privileges to foreign workers who knew the "mystery" and who would come to settle, bringing their skill with them. Nowadays that is no longer necessary. So widely is mechanical skill diffused and so much broader

is the general education of workmen, that it is sufficient to send by post a few copies of a text-book of the machine. Engineers will then study the diagrams and the words, and without ever seeing the original inventor or his machines, will be able to produce the same article that he has made, perhaps three thousand miles away. By these simple modern methods and by the clumsier old methods there has been, for thousands of years, an interchange of knowledge between one country and another, by which each in its turn has added something to the general stock, and the world has at last arrived at its present state of rapidly growing but already immeasurable information and skill. Clearly no part of the work of communications is more worth attention than this work in the sphere of ideas.

Already it must be clear from the illustrations just given that no hard and fast line can be drawn between material and ideal means of communication. If a man set out to estimate the extent and character of French influence on English history, that is, of the results of intercourse between England and France, he might begin with the commodities that have been imported, the silks and wines which England could not herself produce ; he might

pass on to the immigrants, the Huguenots, for instance, but his subject would not be exhausted until he had dealt with the books, practical books like handbooks of medicine or works of thought and literature, like Rousseau's and Calvin's, which have affected English life and manners as much as many hundred shiploads of claret or champagne. And here we should remember that the intercourse of nations by means of books has an organisation at least as complicated as that by railway-carriages and steamers. One might make a fanciful comparison between the two. The literature of each country might be compared to its railway system. The steamship lines, running between the ports of two different countries would be the translations and dictionaries; the innumerable bibliographies, library catalogues, booksellers' lists and so forth would be the time-tables, by which people know what train to take. The man with a good education would have a tourist ticket, permitting him to take long journeys into distant parts, while the less instructed man would never travel by anything but his suburban train, the sporting news. This system has grown up gradually, like the railway systems, by the labour of thousands of men. Not only the writers of

dictionaries and bibliographies, but all the teachers of languages, indeed all teachers and writers and all the compositors, printers, paper-makers, bookbinders and newspaper vendors belong to this vast industry of opening up communications between men's minds.

The mention of the teachers leads on to another aspect of these ideal communications. Nothing has done more than the spread of education to make the ideas of one country accessible to the men of others. In most Western European countries most of the men and women can read. In many the favourite reading is the newspaper, and even the local newspaper of a small market town collects news from all over the world. That news does not really by itself give a very deep or accurate knowledge of the affairs of other countries; it is written out in its final form by men who probably do not understand it very well, and its sources are, as we shall see later, rarely free from some kind of taint. But, when it is thrown together with what the ordinary newspaper-reader knows of foreign countries from other sources, it does amount to something. He has learnt at school a certain amount of geography. At various times he has met returning travellers; if he is an Englishman,

he is pretty certain either to have crossed the sea himself, or to have considered seriously whether to do it or not, or at least to have relations who live abroad, inside or outside the British Empire. After all, popular education is not yet two generations old. Its initial mistakes and difficulties are scarcely over, their effects still present with us. In spite of them all, there are already a vast number of men of all classes who read foreign languages and geography and history ; there is the promise of many more. There are many men whose horizon is really world-wide, who know what they are talking about when they talk about foreign countries, and that not in relation to some particular matter, such as postage stamps, or cookery, but in a wide sense and especially in those matters which affect political relations.

Popular education is not, of course, the sole cause of this. Three other things ought to be mentioned along with it : the extension of the franchise, conscription, and the widening radius of trade. About the first two not much need be said, since they have affected mental intercourse chiefly within the boundaries of the different countries rather than between one country and another ; but conscription, besides bringing

together in the close community of barracks and training-grounds men from distant towns and provinces, has also multiplied greatly the numbers of those who have gone abroad in uniform "for to admire and for to see and for to behold the world so wide," and the vote has given the wanderers something more to look for on their travels. A soldier who is billeted in a school in a foreign country, or a working man who joins a trade-union abroad and gets to know something of its legal position, thinks of these things as part of a social system worse or better than his own, and when he next casts a vote at home, he will remember what he has seen. With the widening radius of trade, we get back to the point we were discussing before, the mutual action and reaction of material and ideal movements. Not only is information carried and curiosity excited by the vast masses of goods that are moved about from one land to another, but in order to carry on this commerce there is a constant circulation of trading men which does more to connect the nations together than any other kind of travelling. Emigrants who go to foreign countries to settle and stay must be very numerous or very distinct in character if they are to make much of a change in their surroundings, nor are

they likely to retain many links with the places of their origin. Tourists who go for pleasure or for some special inquiry notoriously see too little. It is not uncommon to hear regrets expressed that the old custom of the "grand tour," by which rich young gentlemen used to complete their education in a year or two of foreign travel with a tutor, died out somewhere about a century ago. The custom is said to have endowed the young Englishmen, especially the politicians, with a cosmopolitan point of view. They learnt French and became familiar with the ways of courts. A cool observer might, however, decide that the advantage was all with the moderns. The railway has made it possible to reach the further parts of Europe so quickly that the traveller no longer needs to see them, once and for all, on an expedition which takes him away for long months from home. What is more important, it has cheapened the journey, and made it less of an adventure. The meeting-places of the ideas of nations are no longer only courts and the resorts of aristocracies; the commercial rooms of hotels and the clubs of journalists or labour leaders have also their good Europeans. Experience seems to show that the an who learns most about a foreign country is

the man who goes there, not vaguely to "have a look at it," or to "broaden his mind," but the man who goes there to do his own work and, incidentally, to see its life and institutions from the point of view of a man working under them.

In the growth of ideal, as in that of material communications, mechanical invention has played an essential part. To trace the earlier discoveries one would have to go back a long way; the most famous, one of the great inventions of history, is already hundreds of years old, that of printing. Printing multiplied by thousands the power of one man to convey his thoughts with exactness to others, and also the corresponding power by which one man can acquaint himself with the thoughts of others. No subsequent discovery has made such profound changes in these things, but there have been subsequent discoveries and those not contemptible nor yet so remarkable as they may still become. Photography was one. Along with the numerous processes of photographic reproductive printing which follow from it, it has done for the visible appearance of things what printing did for the realities which can be expressed by words. The cinematograph,

one of the more complicated kinds of photography, brings very clearly before millions of people the outward look of the same event. Its existence has been short as yet, and comparatively little has been done to explore its possibilities either as a means of recording real events or as a means of presenting the fictitious events which constitute dramatic art ; but already, almost without forethought, it has become one of the greatest instruments of instruction and enjoyment. During the years which have seen its rise, there has also been a great increase in the use of some minor mechanical aids to the transmission of ideas, such as the humble typewriter. The typewriter applies the principle of the printing press to easy everyday use ; the vast number of " shorthand-typists " who exist to-day enable a still greater body of people, authors in their studies, or clerks in their offices, to record quickly, precisely and in many copies what passes through their minds.

Different in principle from all the older machines are the wonderful electric inventions which convey thoughts without moving any material objects whatever, not even pieces of paper. The electric telegraph was invented early in the nineteenth century. It reached the stage of usefulness for

ordinary business in the year when Queen Victoria came to the throne. In the year 1919, according to the official return of the various countries, the length of the world's telegraph wires was more than one and a half million miles. The first submarine cable was laid in 1840 from Calais to Dover, but it was in 1851 that the cable service between France and England really began. In 1858 came the first successful cable-line across the Atlantic, but not for some years was its success complete. Now, the cable is as regular and almost as universal as the steamship. Not only words but even pictures can be transmitted by it. The telephone, which first caused the British Post Office uneasiness about its telegraphic monopoly in 1880, came into common use in the more advanced countries before the end of the century, and is now so familiar, at any rate in towns, that statistics of the number of telephone messages are almost as ridiculous as would be statistics of the number of conversations in ordinary speech. The phonograph, or gramophone, has only comparatively rarely been used hitherto for anything but amusement; the future may find it more serious employment. A variety of the phonograph, called the "dictaphone," is already

used to some extent in business as a substitute for the shorthand-typist.

Lastly, most marvellous of all, come the wireless machines. Only twenty-one years ago it was first found possible to transmit a press message electrically from France to England without any solid connection between the sending-point and the receiving-point. Almost at once this stupendous power was applied to the use of ships at sea. It led to the capture of fugitives and the saving of shipwrecked crews. Aviation soon reached the point at which it also could use the same aid. The advance in the technique of wireless communication has been very rapid ; the wireless telephone between an aeroplane and the ground is already in use, and ships have received telephone messages by wireless when more than a thousand miles from shore. No comment is needed to show how this increases the usefulness of aeroplanes, for instance in warfare. The success of aeroplanes in signalling the results of artillery fire is well-known. To prophesy, like a famous novelist, how far these things will go would be rash. One might draw a convincing picture of the " special correspondent " of the future transmitting from his aeroplane to an attentive audience in the

Alhambra music-hall the full record, in phonographic and coloured stereoscopic moving pictures, of a riot in the Punjaub, or an earthquake in South America.

Whatever may be the chances of such a consummation as that, the progress that has been made

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is in itself impressive enough to satisfy any man's appetite for marvels. True, the power of sustained admiration is a gift of poets, denied to common men, and most of us have settled down so comfortably with these new miracles that the mere recital of them in a few pages is probably becoming tedious. None the less, any man who wishes to understand the organisation of the modern world must admit that they deserve a good deal of reflective attention, and he would be pretty safe in believing also that our reflection on them, our understanding of what they have done and what they imply, has scarcely kept pace with the rapidity of the inventions themselves. That the modern changes in communications, material and ideal, have altered many things, great and small, in the lives of man and of communities of men, is a platitude. What they have altered, and what is the general sum and result of the

alterations is to some degree understood. A number of writers have dwelt on the fact that the world has now become, in effect, smaller. Space is important to us chiefly because we consume time in getting over it ; a sound practical instinct makes us reckon distances by roads or pathways in hours instead of miles, and no lodging-house keeper dreams of advertising his position as six hundred yards from the station and a furlong from the sea. For practical purposes, the world has really shrunk ; it remains the same size for the cartographer and the landscape painter, but not for the traveller and the reader. The parts of it which rule most of the rest, the countries of Europe and America, have also become more populous, more crowded, and mutually more closely knit. Mr. Graham Wallas has vividly reminded us how in this age " the English factory girl who is urged to join her Union, the tired old Scotch gatekeeper with a few pounds to invest, the Galician peasant when the emigration agent calls, the artisan in a French provincial town whose industry is threatened by a new invention, all know that, unless they find their way successfully among world-wide facts which reach them only through misleading words, they will be crushed." The same writer has done

much in his works to analyse this hurrying, unsettled universe, and especially to show how great are the difficulties of making it a fit habitation for human beings. Yet, though no one can think about these matters without often following where he has gone before, much may still be done in clearing up the details of the great problems.

One of these details is the subject of these pages, a detail from the point of view of the philosopher who surveys the whole unbounded field, but a vast and difficult subject from that of the small cultivator hoeing his own row : the part played by the means of communication in international relations. The study of international relations has very great difficulties. It deals with the relations between a large and constantly varying number of units, the nations, and, to be successful it must find out, first of all, a good deal about the nature of each unit, that is to say, about the history and condition of each nation. Next it must go on to examine the relations of each nation with each other nation, and with all the rest together. Only then can it go on to its final task of distilling from this multitude of separate relations the essential meaning of the whole, the general

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judgments or principles which will serve both as solvents to explain and as stimulants for action in the future. No investigation can be neglected which offers to simplify these complexities, and they can be simplified a little by a separate discussion of the means which the nations have at their disposal for sending or receiving whatever things or men or thoughts are to pass between them.

CHAPTER II

COMMUNICATIONS, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL

BEFORE beginning this task, it is necessary to say a few words of caution. Any results that are obtained will not be exact and certain, at the most some tendencies will be distinguished which result from the present state of communications ; but it must be remembered that, in the complex fabric of social and political life, there are many other tendencies at work, springing from other causes, and that these may sometimes thwart or divert the former. Nor can the system of communications be studied in complete isolation from other aspects of society. Often it will only be possible to show that some phenomenon is due either to it or to a wider whole of which it forms a part. This wider whole is our industrial civilisation in general. The great modern advance in means of communication comes from two things,

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both closely connected, the multiplication of wealth and the invention of mechanical methods of speed ; but these inventions were only a few among many thousands, the others of which, in manufactures and productive processes of all kinds, were essential to the creation of wealth on the modern scale. The one group of devices is never found apart from the rest, nor normally is it found apart from the prosperity which they all help to create. Consequently it is not worth while to try to discriminate too carefully between the narrower and the wider causes. To do so would be like attempting to write a history of gun-carriages without ever referring to the different types of cannon they were meant to carry. Our subject, then, is the influence of communications, material and ideal, on the relations of different states and peoples, and its background is the present industrial civilisation.

It might appear that this was a simple enquiry, that its general principles could be stated in a few sentences, and that nothing would then remain except to show how they have worked in actual fact.

**Analogy of
national
Unity.**

The majority of men who pay attention to the general course of history are probably

of opinion that the quicker and easier the communication between different men and different places, the more unity of all kinds will come to exist among them. One example of this is to be found in a series of historical movements of the highest importance, the rise of the great political states, at least of the more solid and stable among them. It is an admitted truth that the political union of Germany and the federation of Canada, two great events of the nineteenth century, were both much assisted by the growth of the railways of the two countries. But before the railway could make its contribution, there had been other factors of the same kind long at work. Germany had a common language, and clearly the possession of a common language was one of the first conditions of the desire among Germans for a common political organisation. But that common language, like the common speech of the English or the Dutch or the French or the Italians, had not existed from the beginnings of history. It had itself been created partly by the unconscious adjustment of men's tongues to their convenience in trading and talking and singing, partly by a deliberate effort of certain leaders of speaking and writing to make a language which would bind more men together,

or at least bind more closely those they wished to bind. It had been helped by printing, and again by the spread of popular education; its great missionaries were the poet, the parson, the journalist and the schoolmaster. Its victory was not complete; there were still local dialects in the field against it, but the "standard" language in Germany, as in most other modern states, was strong enough to make every kind of intercourse and negotiation very easy between any two or more genuine Germans from any part of the country. As it was with language, so was it with manners and customs and commodities of all kinds. Oysters are no harder to get in Worcester than in Whitstable. The local names of our apples and cheeses are not the names of the places where we have to go to buy them; in a modern country scarcely any local differences of diet remain. Clothes and methods of book-keeping or electing town councils or rotating crops are all in the same way being brought to one level. Centralisation in government and uniformity of manners are two of the most obvious characteristics which mark the contrast between our England and the England of the Tudors. Both of them are results of the growth of communications.

To the first casual glance it looks as if the same

effacing of barriers and differences was in progress, though naturally in a slower progress, between different nations as between different parts of each nation within itself. It is now nearly fifty years since Sir Robert Morier wrote of our planet as, for practical purposes, "shrinking to the proportions of a middle-sized mediæval state." Naturally one expects that our great states will tend, like the mediæval principalities, towards coalescence in larger units. Much of the business and pleasure of every-day life is already the same all over the world. In ancient times it was possible to express the political unity of the human race by saying that the Romans had made one city out of what was formerly a world, or by saying that all roads led to Rome. That sort of unity plainly does not exist to-day, but we can say with truth that Birmingham and Manchester have made one market out of what was formerly a group of continents, and that all soap comes from Lever's. The same films of moving pictures are unrolled in Mesopotamia as in Massachussets, and the same songs are sung, although with different words. Not only does this process appear to be going on, it appears also that in the long run nothing will be able to stand against it.

Let us take at random one of the most obstinate barriers which at present separate the nations and make their interests discordant. The existence of protective tariffs will do as well as another. Historians and politicians have differed, according to their respective interpretations of history, as to the weight which ought to be assigned to these tariffs in estimating the causes of recent wars, but it is certain that they have done much to make the relations of states more difficult and disastrous. The internationalists of the 'forties and 'fifties, of whom Cobden is the type, looked forward to the reign of universal free trade as the economic basis of the peace of the world. Their hopes were disappointed, and the last century ended with a protectionist reaction, but an optimist might say that we have now come in sight of a time when protective duties on imports and exports will become physically impossible. If the facilities for moving goods improve beyond a certain point it becomes futile to try to hinder the movements. When aerial transport becomes a regular commercial method, no army of customs officials will suffice to confiscate every packet of tobacco or saccharine that is dropped, with the aid of an adapted bomb-sight, at a place arranged with the

receiver. Just as the airmen in the war evaded the quarantine and imported rabies, so the airmen of commerce will be able to bring in what they please. This speculative example is enough to show the line of argument by which it is maintained that the world, in all senses and especially as concerns the interests and political desires of states, is becoming one.

Familiar as this argument is, it is difficult even to repeat it without giving rise to some suspicion of its unsoundness, and very little reflection is needed to show that it does not square with the facts.

**The Analogy
Unsound.**

Intercourse between nations is not affected by the development of communications in the same way as intercourse within them. The two things may indeed very easily be represented as inimical to one another. The process of bringing about national unity in economic affairs was, for instance, carried out in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the greater part of Europe by the "mercantile system" of policy, a policy of nationalist commerce which bound the nation together by shutting out the foreigner. Modern advocates of various plans of federation and union have frankly advocated a similar plan : a strong school

among the supporters of Imperial federation in the British Empire held that such federation was impossible without an economic union, that is to say, without a common economic opposition to the rest of the world. In the broadest sense, it is clear that the more the citizens of one country become alike, the more they will probably become unlike their next neighbours. The rise of nationality, happening at different times in different places and under different conditions, has always had the two sides of greater internal unity and greater isolation from the outside world, an isolation easily passing into estrangement and opposition. Thus, if we look only at the broad outlines of the growth of communications from the time of printing and the mariner's compass and ocean-going ships to our own, we shall see that the freer and wider circulation of some kinds of ideas and commodities has gone hand in hand with a more sluggish and restricted movement of others. The example most commonly quoted is the decline of the "universalism" of the Middle Ages, under which, if vaguely, all Christendom was subject to one Pope and one Emperor, all educated men wrote and spoke in Latin as well as in their own vernaculars, and, although Europe was even

more variegated than it is now, the distinction of nations were far less clear and hard. But this is not the only example. There were other wide areas of mutual understanding nearly a thousand years ago, which now have been broken up. At one time the inhabitants of Norway and the Orkneys could understand one another's speech. The process which has made them mutually unintelligible is not yet ended. In recent years it has been the deliberate policy of Norwegian politicians and scholars to make their language artificially different from that of Denmark. Like the fanatics of Irish nationalism, they have tried to cut off the exchange of thoughts. Neither material nor ideal communications between peoples have had free play, nor will they have it for a long time to come.

This is only the beginning of the many perplexities of the enquiry. A further and greater difficulty lies in the fact that, even when there is the utmost freedom of all kinds of intercourse, its results are by no means uniform. The results which we assumed a moment ago to exist whenever internal communications had free play, the smoothing away of differences, the reconciliation of oppositions, are not certain to come about unless

some other conditions are present besides : although in England the London fashions have been victorious, in most European countries and in Scotland local costumes still survive. Although Canada and Ireland and Belgium have their railways, they still have their local and racial hatreds.

This is still more true of international affairs. It is a fact, none the less real for being unpleasant, that intimacy between two nations does not necessarily bring amity. Many instances could be given, but, since they are much alike, it will be enough to mention one or two. Before the days of steam, the English were probably never more intimate with any nation than they were in the seventeenth century with their neighbours oversea, the Dutch. The two peoples had much in common. Racially they were not far apart ; in religion, in their commercial and sea-faring habits, to some extent even in their institutions, they were similar. There was much intercourse of all kinds ; each harboured the refugees of the other, for each the other's trade was important. Yet the main feature of their dealings with one another in that age was rivalry, a rivalry which led to three hard-fought wars. Nor is there much to show that the Englishmen who knew Holland best or the

Dutchmen who knew England best were more pacific than their fellows. It would be very hard to say what are the conditions which make a traveller friendly to the countries he visits. Many stories have been told all over Europe in the last few years which show that even the consciousness of being allies together in a desperate war is not enough by itself to make a good understanding, and not even the consciousness of being enemies is enough by itself to prevent it. While this is so, it is easy to see how ineffective are some of the efforts which have been made to encourage a good disposition towards one people in another. Societies have been formed to organise exchanges of visits between two countries ; labour leaders, members of Parliament, schoolboys, journalists, have been shipped abroad and lectured and feasted. Professors have exchanged their chairs with foreign professors. New chairs have been founded, of which several exist in England now, and more are likely to come, for experts on the history and literature and politics of one country to conduct a sort of propaganda in another. There are scholarships, like the now disestablished Rhodes scholarships for Germany. There are dining-clubs, where politicians and business men meet

together to praise antiphonally one another's countries. There are kings and queens and presidents who drive through cheering crowds to dine together and do the same. Some effect, no doubt it all has, but it seems always to be feeble in comparison with the force of national antipathy, once that force is loosed, and at times it only adds to antipathy instead of diluting it. Evidently much careful investigation will be needed before we can be sure of knowing why and when and how far free communication between countries acts like free communication within them.

The simplest way of tackling these questions is to look at them from the political point of view,

**Reasons for
taking the
political
point of View.** to pay attention, that is, to the policies of the states rather than to wander among the innumerable by-paths of relations between the individual citizens or the groups and associations of citizens which have dealings abroad. This does not mean that the political point of view is the only, or even ultimately the best point of view to take. The advantage of taking it is that it is central. The political machinery by which the world is, as we say, governed, or rather the assemblages of independent political machines,

whose co-operation or parallel movement or collisions give the world as a whole such government as it gets, is a group of clearing-houses through which any business whatsoever that affects great bodies of men may, and most such business does now regularly pass. Every political question has been a question of some other kind before it becomes a question of politics. It may be a matter of religion, like the disputes between Catholics and Protestants, which began among theologians, but engaged the attention of princes as soon as they made a dangerous division among the masses of church-goers, or it may be economic in its origin, like so much of the business of parliaments in our times. It may be discussed first of all only by lawyers or teachers or sailors or colonists or actors, but in our world, in which every man's interests are so closely interwoven with those of every other man, if it is a matter on which there is much disagreement, or to settle which great resources of money or authority are needed, it will not end with any such special class, but it will become part of the *agenda* of civil servants and elected representatives. No more varied catalogue of subjects could well be found than those of the questions asked in the House of Commons : in one day's

report they deal with unemployment, divorce, the adulteration of food, the publication of historical manuscripts, the safety of a rifle-range, an island in the Pacific, and a dozen other things no more closely connected than these. In fact there is no connection at all, except that they all affect the public welfare, or, which is much the same thing, that they are all questions too difficult or too great for anything except the state to solve. When they are solved, the state ceases to be the interested party. Its work is done. It has nothing more to think of except the filing and preservation of the papers that have passed through its offices and assemblies. Those who are affected by its decision, who benefit or suffer from it, are the individual citizens and their various associations. With them the matter ends, as it began with them; the clearing-house is only a point through which their business passes on the course of its roundabout journey out and home. It is not, therefore, with the intention of treating international relations as essentially relations between states, and of assuming that these states have interests of their own, capable of being understood by themselves and without paying any heed to the lesser concerns of human beings, that

we shall take the political point of view. It is simply in order to pick up the handiest clue in the labyrinth of all the relations, economic, intellectual, religious or what not, between different peoples of the world.

CHAPTER III

EFFECTS OF WAR AND COMMERCE ON COMMUNICATIONS

AMONG the many activities of states there is one department in which they have, to the utmost limits allowed by their circumstances and organisation, controlled and furthered the development of communications. That department is war. When a state is at war, at least if it is a serious war, all other aims and enterprises are subordinated to the supreme object of mastering the enemy. The more serious the war, the more clearly this will be so, and the state which is quickest to make all other interests give way before the need for victory will gain a great advantage in the struggle. It is possible that the claim of war to take the first place may be too ruthlessly, or at any rate too indiscriminately, enforced; in many countries during the last few years there have been distressed liberals who have protested vainly against this kind of

harshness, some of them giving to it the name, a name used also in many other senses, of "militarism." Yet these liberals themselves would not have denied in so many words that, once a state has entered on hostilities, its first task, in comparison with which all others are negligible, is the fighting. In this a state of war differs fundamentally from a state of peace. In quiet times there is no single aim which all men will admit to be the essential work in which the whole nation ought to co-operate and to which all private wishes and selfish ends ought to give way. We might, indeed, find common ground in some vague formula like "good government," or "justice," but, as soon as we began to explain what we meant by it, we should find ourselves in a world of controversy and doubt. Half the hard work and half the perplexities of ordinary politics belong to the endeavour to find out, not the means of reaching the state's aims, but those aims themselves. This is the main function of representative institutions and of political wisdom in general. In war we can see the target, in peace we have to find one in the fog. War, therefore, though it is destructive and ruinous, clears the way for change. Everyone knows that measures like the plan of "daylight saving" were

suggested in vain by common sense in the times of peace, and that it was only their military advantage that ultimately carried them out and carried them out easily and quickly.

It happens that practically every kind of mobility, material or spiritual, has a military value. There has been some controversy among military historians as to how far, in certain changes in the art of war, the improvement of communications has led to greater efficiency in armies, or how far it is the desire to wage war more successfully that has dictated the improvement of communications. On both sides of the discussion it is assumed, and the fact of the discussion makes it clearer still, that the two things go together. Nor need one be a military specialist to see how important this connection has been for the history of the world. The Roman roads were military roads. After the Romans there were no such road-makers until Napoleon, whose military empire made the last of the great systems of continental roads for horse and foot and guns and waggons. Warfare had scarcely felt the full effect of the introduction of railways when the internal combustion engine came to serve it. Every newspaper has told us how in the late

European war reconnaissance was revolutionised by the aeroplane and airship, the movements of troops in the zone of action by the motor-'bus, the movements of machine guns and artillery, especially of heavy artillery, by the many kinds of motor-traction. The tank came last of all, and the tanks, like fighting aircraft, have not yet had time to do more than stimulate the more imaginative students to make guesses about what they will some-day become. These were spectacular changes : it has been well said by Mr. H. G. Wells that none of them was more important than the prosaic invention of the motor-lorry. While the other methods of movement were enabling armies to hit harder and more quickly and more surely, the lorry gave them more to hit with. The volume of supply was vastly multiplied ; it became possible to send far more food and far more equipment and munitions to the fighting troops. But the list does not end with the lorry, nor with the telegraph and telephone and wireless. Popular education, which we have mentioned as one of the ideal means of communication, may seem the least likely to have a use for soldiers ; yet the post-bag had a recognised value in keeping up morale in the trenches, and one of the greatest difficulties

of the Russian imperial army in its last days lay in the transmission of orders and reports when there was a scarcity of non-commissioned officers and military officials who could read and write. In the British army, one result of the war has been the foundation of a strong department of military education.

It is not our business here to analyse the effect of all these factors on the conduct of war as it is regarded by the soldier. Our concern is with war as an institution, as a method of conducting their affairs to which states from time to time have recourse. We have to enquire how this institution has been affected by the increase, for military ends, of every kind of mobility, an increase in which all states have gone as far as their means would let them, like rival buyers in an auction-sale, each one forcing his allies and opponents to a higher bid. Four main tendencies can be disentangled. They are not equal in importance, and some of them are less certain than others, but the least certain and the least important of the four will be a powerful influence in the international relations of the future.

The first tendency is the enlargement of the theatres of wars. Distant wars have always

been familiar : the French and English have long been accustomed to sending
Extension of the Area of War. fleets and armies, as the Romans sent them, to the ends of the known world. Nor is it a new thing to find war in remote places coming as an accompaniment to a conflict between European powers : every schoolboy who remembers his Macaulay knows how in the time of the war of the Austrian Succession, "black men fought on the coast of Coromandel, and red men scalped each other by the Great Lakes of North America." But there have been and there still are limits of space and natural obstacles in the way of damaging an enemy and collecting men and materials to use in doing it. In Chatham's time, even if anyone had thought of the plan, it would have been impossible to transport into Europe all the Chinese coolies, the black troops from Senegal and the Asiatics who lately fought in Europe. Mechanical invention, material prosperity, and the political domination of the world by the West, have made the obstacles much less formidable. The most formidable of all, the difference between land and sea, still kept, throughout the last war, most of its old strength. The narrow seas were a barrier to the armies of William II. just as they

had been to the armies of Napoleon. But warfare in the air had gone far enough to make men look forward to a time when the sea will no longer make Britain strategically insular. If this is so with the sea, it is far more so with the other old insulating media. Mountain ranges and great distances used to shut countries off one from another ; the timely reinforcement of an army in Venetia by troops from the north of France was one among many miracles which show how their military importance has declined. The greater the growth of communications, the easier it is for each state to use its fighting resources at any point in the world where it chooses to bring them to bear. There has never been anything like the wanderings and jumblings of armies in the last war, but, in dwelling on the picturesqueness of the allied parade-days in Paris, men were apt to forget that their lesson was the unity of the effort, not the heterogeneity of the forces which it brought together. Almost every man of military age in any place in the world has become an object of cupidity to the recruiting agents of Europe and America, and, once recruited, he may be used almost anywhere. In the same way, all things can be carried and used wherever they are wanted. Above all,

states, which are the great rulers of men and things, the great purveyors who can supply them by the shipload and on the cheapest terms, can all be useful or dangerous. In reckoning up the possible allies on one side or another in a war between great powers, it is no longer possible to omit any nation for its remoteness or for the barriers in its way.

The second tendency is the complement of the first : as it is with the nations, so it is, inside them,

**Absorption of
ational
esources by
War.** with their component parts. In reckoning up its resources for warlike purposes, a state can take account of an ever greater proportion of its population and its

wealth. During the nineteenth century there was a widespread belief that war could be "limited." Only certain persons marked as combatants were to take part in it. They were to use only comparatively humane means of offence and they were to use them only against combatants like themselves. Civilians were to stand aside and watch the soldiers fight : it was to be a crime on their part if they joined in, and crime to inflict injury on them. That dream has ended. It is certainly no longer unknown to public opinion that the

civilian work of production and supply is vital to military operations ; if there is a common error on this point now it is the error of overrating their importance in comparison with that of direct military action. Nor, although the recognition is generally accompanied by some expression of horror, do many men fail to recognise that it is the nature of modern warfare to inflict injuries on civilians. Long-range weapons and blockade cannot discriminate between non-combatants and legitimate victims. No state which has hands in it capable of working a lathe is likely to care whether they are men's hands or women's.

When these two tendencies are put together, the widening of the area of war and the absorption of the whole energies of the nations, they produce the third, an immense increase in the concentration and rapidity of the blows delivered against an enemy. A modern industrial state going to war can already fling almost all its strength into the field and summon to its assistance huge reserves of force from less civilised parts of the world ; but much of the technique of doing this was only learnt in the course of a long and exhausting war in which, the more clearly the states came to

**Greater
severity of
War.**

understand their business, the less they had the means of doing it. To imagine a new war, carefully prepared and suddenly begun with strong determination by a state fully equipped with ships and aeroplanes, with fuel and food and men, is to imagine something far more destructive than what the world has seen. Much has eloquently been written about the horrors of future wars ; here we have only to observe that a tendency to greater severity, towards *le guerre absolue*, is one of the consequences of the unifying of the world.

A fourth tendency has been noticed which somewhat modifies the first three. It has been suggested

War as a that war is now becoming so costly
Luxury. and so deadly that only strong and
rich states will be able to undertake

it, or at least that the small and poor countries will not be able to make war in defiance of the will of the great powers, and, most probably, will be able to do so only as their auxiliaries or dependent allies. At the time when one minor power after another was hastening to join the combination against Germany and Austria, this seemed an obvious truth. Now, two years later, when the greater powers are all uneasily at peace, and many of the lesser are fighting hard, it requires some

justifying if not some modification. No doubt, if the great powers had complete command of all their subjects, and if they were always in agreement amongst themselves to prevent their smaller neighbours from resorting to arms, the principle would be true enough. At present neither of these necessary conditions exist. No beginning has been made in the control of even private trade in arms and munitions of war from one country to another. The internal cohesion of the great states has been much shaken and the prospects of common action among them are dark. This fourth tendency is crossed and countered by others which, perhaps only temporarily, prevail.

An objection ought now to be noticed which has probably occurred to the vigilant reader of the last few pages. It is all very well to say that war developes, opens up, communications, but this is true only in a limited field. Essentially war is a divider. The more completely the state of war is brought about, the fewer transactions there are between the opposing sides, and the modern history of warfare is the history of a gradually closer and closer approach to the complete cessation of all relations except hostile relations. In the

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seventeenth century, it was by no means the general rule for two nations, merely because they were at war, to cease to carry on their trade with one another. Private correspondence of all kinds, except only treasonable correspondence, was tolerated often as openly as in peace. One side of the stricter control now exercised by the state over its subjects on land and sea, a control made possible by the greater speed and range of the actions of governments, is the cutting-off of dealings with the enemy. Military exigencies do not, however, operate in this way only in time of war ; it is not only by digging trenches across the highways and dropping mines on the trade-routes that they restrict movements. Even in peace there are military considerations to which roads have to be sacrificed. A map of the roads and railways of Europe would not be intelligible to a student who knew only the physical and economic geography. He would see unaccountable lines where the roads were interrupted or ran only as narrow mule-tracks, and, to explain them to him, it would be necessary to point out that these were political frontiers, places where one nation or the other did not wish the going to be too easy, lest it should be used by an invader. Many expert and inexperienced

persons have wrangled in letters to the *Times* as to whether the Channel Tunnel, if it is ever built, will be strategically dangerous to England. Few or none have questioned the principle that if it is dangerous it ought not to be built. Still more is this all true of ideal communications. The militarist spirit, as most of the world now knows from experience, is a narrow spirit, obstructive of freedom and enlightenment. Education may be useful to a soldier, but he is not the likeliest man to get or give it. Moreover, the inventor who serves warlike purposes aims at destroying the enemy's communications as much as at perfecting his own, so that war is always undoing the good it has done. If it improves aeroplanes, it also improves machine-guns and tracer-bullets ; if it improves wireless, it also learns how to jam it ; if it trains signallers, it also kills them. Its services to mobility must not be rated too high.

One must not, then, imagine that war renders states more able and willing than they are in times of peace to develop communications. Equally, however, one must not ignore the fact that there are many other kinds of rivalry and opposition between states which prevent

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intercourse exactly as war prevents it. So often have governments interfered to check the growth of roads and railways and telegraphs and travelling, that one might imagine, if the words were not very nearly meaningless, that they had done more to hinder than to help it. There may be excellent reasons for it, but it is clear that when the Englishman goes to Paris for a holiday, it is the private capitalists of the railway companies who take him there and back, while the governments merely see to it that he does not take certain articles in his luggage, and that he does fulfil certain requirements which are necessary before a passport is given him. These restrictions may not seem very serious to the holiday-maker, but to the importing merchant or the alien immigrant, they may be almost matters of life or death. To the welfare of whole populations they may mean as much as the old tyrannical restrictions, like the closing of the Scheldt for more than a century by the consent of all the great European powers, in order that Holland might flourish by the decay of Antwerp. It is sometimes said that this measure was typical of its age and that civilisation had long advanced beyond that point, the point when the English put forward claims to the sovereignty of the Narrow Seas,

when the Spaniards and Portuguese tried to keep the new worlds to themselves, when the Danes took their toll at the Sound, when the Swedes allowed no foreign merchant to stay on their soil more than two months in the year, when every state which commanded a highway managed it for selfish advantages, without any thought of the general interests of traders and travellers of whatever allegiance. Many of the more flagrant of these restrictions have disappeared, but, although reference may be made to many treaties which do throw open particular routes so impartially that they deserve to be called "international," and although this conception of international highways is comparatively new, its importance must not be exaggerated. Few completely international or non-national highways, if by that is meant routes on which all traffic of all nations will always be permitted to pass without any interference on the ground of its nationality, can be said to exist. Some of the rivers which are called "international" are not equally accessible to all races, but only to those through whose territory they flow. The high seas are free in time of peace; the Panama Canal and the Suez Canal are almost free; but these are only sections of routes. No one carries

cargo from one point outside territorial waters to another, and restrictions at or above high-water mark are just as cramping to traffic as any closing of waters. Much remains to be done in opening routes, and the "jealousy of trade" is still one of the main motives of international policy, interfering with mobility in all directions. In the year 1872 the government of Persia made an agreement with a European financier who, in connexion with an enormous loan, was to undertake the economic development of the country. Amongst other great works, he was to lay down a network of railways to serve every part of it. The governments of Europe intervened to stop this work, and to this day there is no railway in Persia, except a little scrap of line in the neighbourhood of Teheran. The grandiose design of a trunk-line from Berlin to Basra, after long and tangled negotiations, came to a similar stop. If the great war had not broken out, the other powers might have made no more objections to the German plans, but, if we are to believe all that is said about the hopes built on them by Germany, perhaps it is for the best that the work has been interrupted. For years, maps of Asia have been in circulation with "projected railways" scored up and down them, and it has not been for

lack of money or rails or engineers that these have not been built. Peace has its obstructionists, not less effective than war's.

The two kinds of obstruction have, of course, the same foundation, the territorial basis of our political organisation. Within certain territorial boundaries, governments are almost all-powerful, and, the greater the development of communications, the more powerful they need to be. At present, to maintain themselves in war, they need to be able to command the services of all men of military age as soldiers, and of the rest of the people in any capacity in which they can be used. War is no longer an occurrence to which, in the hour of need, society can adjust itself. It is no longer enough for every man to have a bow and arrows hanging on his wall ready for use when the enemy is on the march. An elaborate organisation has to be built up in time of peace, penetrating every corner of our complicated society. War is an institution, a secondary or alternative purpose for all the energies and resources of the land. When it begins, the whole machine works even more strenuously than in peace, and the greater speed and tension of its movements make the

component parts harder to replace and more dangerous if they work loose. Modern war presupposes, far more than war ever did before, the unity of all those who live and work behind the front. When there are alliances, it needs, of course, unity between the allies, but the unity which it fosters every day, to which it has contributed far more than is commonly understood, is national unity, the unity of the inhabitants of the state. From this unity there are now scarcely any exemptions ; there are no *imperia in imperio*, few geographical *enclaves*, or moral *enclaves* like those of the " conscientious objectors." Industry, based as it is on national currencies, national labour-conditions and a general national organisation, in the same way, as it has become more complex, has tended to become in some ways, though not in all, a source of division instead of unity between the nations. So, though war and prosperity tend to do away with physical and ideal barriers, there is one exception to their laying low of obstacles ; they may contribute to pile higher the ramparts which surround those who live together under a common flag on a common plot of ground.

It must not, of course, be supposed that these

ramparts are altogether the creations of deliberate policy. The actions of states have not played the greatest part in either facilitating or hindering international communications. When all the means of communication which are owned or controlled by states are added together, postal unions, bounty-fed shipping, schools and universities or whatever they may be, although it will appear that the states have done a great deal, it will also be seen that in many of the greatest developments they took no part, and that even when they have acted, it has often been as mere auxiliaries of economic "interests" within them. Bounty-fed shipping is a case in point. It may be regarded either as navigation artificially encouraged by subsidies, or as a diversion of national wealth from the places to which it would have been more spontaneously and profitably applied. In either case, whether the state ultimately helps or hinders movement by using this method, it is a matter of historical fact that the method has been normally applied by the state at the instance of shipowners, who stood to profit by it. Thus, even some of the cases in which it appears that the state has promoted communication are really not in conflict with the general principle that the political point of view, the point

of view of the public good of the communities, has been taken up, so far as these questions are concerned, only intermittently and only incompletely. So much are modern states dominated by the economic power of some of their citizens that it is hard, even in countries where "state socialism" has gone very far, to find political purposes other than military purposes and as distinguished from half-private economic purposes like those of interested protectionists, exerting a direct and constant influence on the opening-up or restricting of commerce or other intercourse with foreign countries. The means of communication, as each has been invented, have been used and developed for their own immediate purposes by those whom it paid to use them. Some of them are owned and ruled by traders, like the manufacturers who own their own ships or river-barges, but usually they belong to groups of capitalists whose one business is to sell these services to any who choose to pay for their use. One of the primary facts which determine the interchange of persons, goods and information is the fact that the means of intercourse are owned commercially. Such is the modern organisation of ships, of telegraphic cables, of wireless, of news-agencies.

The states, in their dealings with one another use these private services for many things ; that is a testimony to their efficiency. For some purposes, indeed, such as information, the states to a certain extent use their own organisations, but even the cipher dispatches of ambassadors are carried on packet-boats which are privately owned. It would be difficult to say in any simple formula how far the ownership of capital is based on national units. For some purposes, in analysing international trade, it is best to disregard the political units and to look for purely economic groupings. A

reat deal is said about international finance and about the many strands of mutual indebtedness or common control which connect the economy of one country with that of others, but, partly as a result of the past policies of state-making on an economic basis, partly as a result of the fact that most business-men, like most other men, are bred up in national ways and the national habit of mind and know no other, there is no world in which frontiers are more important than in the business world. When, as it happens not infrequently, the influence of frontiers on communications is due to this non-political nationalism, it is hard for any statesman to change it. If it

arose from conscious policy, a force far less deeply rooted in human nature, it would be easier to modify or weaken.

Each state may be regarded as an institution which, amongst other things, furthers and guarantees the economic interests of its members. There are many different ways in which this function is discharged ; some states take the capitalists, industrial or commercial, as the representatives of the general interest and grant favours to them ; others confine their kindness to the working men ; most attempt to satisfy both. All, however, render economic service, and, in doing so, all are prepared to use force either at home or abroad. At home the force may be used to protect private property or to destroy it ; abroad, it may be used to obtain commercial concessions, as in the English " opium war " against China, or to overthrow an infectious social system, as in the campaigns against Bolshevism, and in its defence. The growth of communications increases in many ways the value of the stakes for which force can be used. It opens up new markets and new sources of supply, and it invites the nations to a race for their possession. The process may

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go on peacefully : even the precarious friendships of the great powers in the thirty years before the last war were not broken down in the gigantic competition by which Africa was opened up. The fighting in Africa was fighting between the new-comers and natives or old-established Dutch inhabitants, not between the different nations of new-comers themselves. Morocco and the Egyptian Soudan came near to provoking wars, but, in the end, war came over questions of who was to rule older and more developed countries, those inhabited by Serbs and Belgians. In a sense it is true, in spite of the intensity of the rivalries in undeveloped Africa and Asia, that the shocks of conflicts in those regions had somewhat lost their force when they made themselves felt in the capitals of Europe. But, the more closely knit the world became, the less was this true. It is the curse of prosperity that it makes necessities of what were formerly luxuries, and the huge machine of international commerce and industry needed so much material of all kinds to keep it in motion that every rich nation was coming to depend on others. One by one the nations have ceased to produce enough food for their swollen populations : Holland as early as the seventeenth

century, England in the nineteenth. Even the United States may reach this point in the twentieth. The Lancashire cotton-famine during the American Civil War, still a gloomy memory in that county, was only the first in a long series of object-lessons which show how the dislocation of the industrial system cannot be kept within the limits of one country, but drags down a whole group dovetailed together by trade.

In such a world, politics must conform to the requirements of business. No government dare risk the charge of neglecting the economic needs of its people, and therefore none dare be indifferent to the mutual action of politics and economics abroad. The fundamental change in the political relations of the two hemispheres is no more than one particular case of this general tendency to the interlocking of the concerns of all nations. When, with calmer eyes, historians trace the steps by which the United States came to intervene in the European war, they will probably find this connecting thread where to us it is not clearly visible. The American participation in the Algeiras Conference on Morocco, the American mediation after the war between Russia and Japan, the journey

of the American fleet round the world when Mr. Roosevelt was President, will take their places as small strands in a great tissue of changes by which America is becoming a European power, by which the old European system of states is spreading out to embrace the whole world. One aspect of this has already been mentioned, the enlargement of the sweep of wars. Now that the greater fact has to be considered of which that is a part, it will be seen that still more emphasis must be laid on the conclusions that were then drawn. It is a very general rule that, the more complicated an organisation becomes, the greater is the skill required to keep it in action and the more disastrous is the breakdown when that skill is wanting. Nowhere is this more true than in the growing complexity of international relations. There is no inhabited part of the globe where a conflict may not arise which will threaten the Londoner or the Parisian with hunger and disease. With the development of communications, the calamities which result from natural and political disturbances become more widespread, more terrible and at the same time more concentrated in their effects. It becomes more and more easy for a state to precipitate them in its reasonable and

unavoidable attempts to look after the welfare of its own people.

There is, indeed, in the minds of some politicians still a survival of the most hopelessly discredited of all theories, the theory that war in the grand style may be a "paying proposition." It was a theory that flourished absurdly in Germany before the last war, and was perversely used by professors as the explanation of the wealth and greatness of England ; if it is still cherished by any member of any European nation, that is a crowning proof of the madness of our times. For the great majority of men the only possible wars of the future seem to be wars of necessity, and of defence. They believe that they may live to see another great war, but they believe that if they do see it, it will be a war, like the first wars which Plato saw to have arisen in a simpler world, for earth to live on and food to eat. If they are mistaken, if there is still the other possibility that there may come wars of irrational hate and inhuman folly, still they have this much of right on their side, that for every man, woman and child, in every war of great states, bare existence is at stake, though it is threatened but little more by defeat than by victory. It is making a fool's paradise for ourselves if we do not

also see that the statesmen, using their old tools for their harder task, are made by every fresh, uncontrolled advance in the means of production and communication, more impotent to ward off this disaster. A reduction of population or a great growth of the power to produce goods might restore for a time the more tolerable state of things in which war cut less deeply into social structure, but, for the present, the tendency is for war to approximate more and more closely to universal ruin.

Here we may turn aside for a moment to consider one of the consequences of the private ownership of the means of international communication. Private property or capitalism, whatever may be understood by the terms, is an institution of which many classes of men, especially of manual workers in industrial countries, do not approve. Working men have formed trade-unions and other combinations, of which the final aims are somewhat unsettled, but of which the action necessarily transfers to the workmen some of the power formerly exercised by their masters. Knowing by experience that they can sometimes refuse to do work they are told to do, they tend to refuse

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whenever their reason is strong, whatever may be its nature, and, in particular, the men who do the handiwork in international communications have several times abstained from doing what they disliked for political reasons. Sometimes their grounds were connected with the international labour movement, as when the railwaymen refused to handle munitions for Poland, and the dockers to load the "Jolly George." At other times they have acted on grounds of nationalism, as when the seamen refused to carry delegates to an international labour conference in which enemies were to be represented. Although they have not always acted on the same principles, they have shown themselves prepared to risk industrial conflict on behalf of their policies. Their employers, in declining to carry goods of a particular kind, would have taken no risk except the risk, always deterrent to them, of leaving the work to a competitor, so one would not expect much difficulty in persuading a ship-owner to do a little gun-running that was not specifically illegal. The cable company, the news-agency, and the newspaper, having less to fear from competition, would be more free, but, if they do influence the ideal communications between nations for political ends, they do so with

effective concealment. Complaints against the unfairness of newspaper-proprietors and editors in suppressing or distorting foreign intelligence are very common, and they come especially from those who attribute all the errors of foreign policy to the action of financiers and other capitalists. However much or little truth there is in these allegations, it will be impossible to pass judgment on them here. If this sinister interference with information does go on, its influence is *ex hypothesi* occult. It would be very hard to estimate the importance of that influence. Only from the actions of labour do men see plainly the possibility that those who work the international communications need not always stick to the neutral rôle of selling their services to all comers. No doubt that would continue to be so, whatever alterations were made in the ownership and control of these instruments. If the states owned them, or if they were owned by international authorities, those employed about them would be none the less able for that to refuse to do their work. Historically, however, such refusals as the workmen have made would not have been possible without the labour movement, and this is significant. It is because the employers do not command the loyalty of the

men, because they are believed to act from motives of profit and not of principle, that the men have acted on their own notions of principle, importing a public element into what their masters regarded as their private work.

CHAPTER IV

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND COMMUNICATIONS

WITHOUT attempting to give a systematic account of the dealings of states with this non-political structure of communications, an account which probably could not be given because the thing itself has been not systematic but casual and chaotic, we may notice one or two famous examples of it. First come the cases in which the aid of the state has been invoked to bring some great line of communication under one flag. The phrase "under one flag" is vague, but so is the condition itself, and so are the promises of benefit from it. In the case of the railway from the Cape to Cairo, the interposition of frontier-posts on the line might give an opportunity for vexatious tariffs, or for a sort of blackmail in demanding unduly heavy payments from the owners of the railway to run through a strip of foreign territory, or for still more wasteful obstructions such as

differences of gauge or loading regulations. The demand that, for the purposes of the railway, all the land through which it runs should be British territory, presupposes the possibility that another state might try to hamper the railway with such measures as these. It implies a great distrust of the prospects of international communications by land, and it is hard to draw any line between its argument and the argument of the Russians who claimed Constantinople, which was also the argument of Trotsky's guns on the Esthonian front. The historic mission of Russia, as it is sometimes called, was the mission of getting possession of routes in order to make sure of the right to use them. In another form the same principle may be seen in the demand for an "All-Red" cable line. Anyone who wishes to make an investigation of the mysterious cross currents of commercial patriotism might do worse than begin with Mr. Richard Jebb's book, *The Imperial Conference*, which describes the colonial conference of 1894. Here he will not indeed find any full account of why it is for the advantage of an empire to have political control of the points where the cables connecting it come to land. That is an article of belief which, for most imperialists at any rate,

needs no more support than a vague general appeal to strategic and commercial considerations. Mr. Jebb's book, however, gives a narrative, sufficiently full to provoke one's curiosity, of the public negotiations in which the obscure political and commercial forces concerned in the matter came for a time into the light. The records of these negotiations are part of the evidence which, at some time in the future, will have to be used for an estimate of the influence of nationality on ideal communications.

There is no better way of seeing how questions of transport become subjects of dispute between nations, and how much political negotiation and agreement can do to settle them, than to examine the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

**The Treaty
of Versailles,
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References to communications are to be found scattered all over it. In the unobtrusive "miscellaneous provisions" at the end is embodied an agreement between France and Switzerland about High Savoy. High Savoy is a region which has not belonged to France many years. It was ceded within living memory to Napoleon III, but the change of allegiance was made more acceptable to the inhabitants by allowing

them to retain their freedom of trade with Switzerland, a country with which they were more closely connected economically than with France. France, amongst other things, is now to have the right to adjust her customs line in High Savoy, "in conformity with her political frontier, as is done on the other portions of her territorial boundaries, and as was done by Switzerland long ago on her own boundaries in this region." By this treaty, then, one of the few surviving exceptions to the rule that the political frontiers are also economic frontiers, is swept away ; the passenger's luggage on the train to Geneva will no longer be examined at Bellegarde, well within French territory.

On the other hand, new exceptions are created. The resuscitated state of Poland is not to be shut in by the limits of its territory. It is to have not merely free access to a limited area like High Savoy, but to a great centre of international trade, the Free City of Danzig. This Free City is to be ruled under a constitution drawn up by its representatives in agreement with a High Commissioner appointed by the League of Nations, who is also to have the duty of dealing in the first instance with all differences arising under the treaty between the Free City and Poland. The Free City is to

be included in the Polish customs frontiers, and the Poles are to have the free use and service of all waterways, docks, basins, wharves, and other works necessary for Polish exports and imports, and the right to develop and improve them. They are further to have the control and administration of the River Vistula, which connects the Free City with their territory, of the railways, except those which are purely local, and of the "ideal" means of communication as well, the postal, telegraphic and telephonic communications between Poland and the port of Danzig. When it is added that Poland is to control the foreign policy of the Free City, it will be seen that the freedom allowed to it is incomplete, falling far short of sovereign independence. Danzig has had a very narrow escape of being made a part of Poland; the Poles have stopped short of taking everything from it, but they have taken what they considered vital to their own economic welfare. It is worth remembering that, wherever territory has actually changed hands, besides the other things which the Poles did not get in Danzig, all this has passed as well. Wherever the ceded lands are important for communications, their cession will probably mean that routes will be made easier for some and

harder for others, that the courses of trade will be changed. Among the many aspects of the disputes over Teschen, Fiume, and many other places, this is not the least important.

Not only in the territorial clauses of the treaty but also in the economic provisions which make up its tenth part, there are many incidental references to communications. Articles 282—4 revive a number of "multilateral" agreements, that is, agreements between several powers, by which international economic arrangements were regulated before the war. More than forty of these are enumerated, and all of them have some bearing on international communications, though some, such as those on the protection of birds or the establishment of a uniform concert pitch for musical instruments, need not detain us now. There are agreements on the standardisation of railways by which international through traffic is made possible, on the protection of submarine cables, on the Suez Canal, and on the redemption of the toll on the Elbe at Stade, and of the tolls on the Scheldt. There are three groups of postal agreements, two of telegraphic agreements, and a convention on radio-telegraphy. This stands for a partial revival of the system of international

communications which existed before the war. In what sense and for what reasons the revival is incomplete will best be seen in another example, that of the parts of the treaty which deal directly with the communications of Germany.

The eleventh part of the treaty deals with aerial navigation in eight articles; the twelfth part, consisting of six sections which amount altogether to sixty-six articles, deals with ports, waterways and railways. The more general provisions, such as the permission for aeroplanes of the allied powers to fly over German territory and territorial waters, may be regarded as incidents of a state of peace, but even these are conceded by Germany with a remarkable absence of reservations. No regulations are to be applied to allied aeroplanes which are not also applied to those of the Germans; on the other hand, the Allies are not bound to mete out the same treatment to the Germans. Germany is to grant freedom of transit, without discrimination of charges or other hindrances, and even without customs duties, to persons, goods, vessels, railway carriages, waggons and mails passing from one allied power to another. She is not to grant preferential advantages to imports or exports carried through German ports over

those carried across the land frontiers from foreign ports, nor to discriminate in any way by tariffs or otherwise against the trade of any allied power. The nationals of any of the allied or associated powers, as well as their vessels and property, are to be treated in all German ports and on all German waterways on an equality with those of Germany. Germany is to continue the practice by which, before the war, there were free zones in her ports, where goods might be landed and then re-exported without passing through the customs.

Four great German rivers which flow also through the territory of other powers, the Elbe and Moldau, the Oder, the Niemen, the Danube, with certain canals belonging closely to them, are declared international. That is to say that on them "the nationals, property and flags of all powers shall be treated on a footing of perfect equality." A convention is to be drawn up by the allies and approved by the League of Nations, laying down the details of the administration. Germany is to cede to the allies a portion of her tugs and vessels on the rivers, the number of which is to be determined by arbitrators appointed by the United States, "due regard being had to the legitimate needs of the parties concerned." The

Elbe is to have a commission, composed of four representatives of the German states bordering on the river, two of Czecho-Slovakia, and one each from Great Britain, France Italy and Belgium. A similar commission for the Oder is to have three Prussian representatives and one each from Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Great Britain, France, Denmark and Sweden. On a request to the League of Nations by any one of the states on its banks, the Niemen is to be placed under the administration of a Commission on which are to sit one representative of each of the states on the course of the river, and three representatives of other states specified by the League of Nations. Thus all these commissions are to have members not only from the inhabitants of the surrounding countries, but also from some of the great trading powers at a distance from them. The Danube, which has now an even greater number of states along its banks than before, was governed on its lower course from the time of the Crimean War by a commission with one representative each from Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia (the predecessor of the kingdom of Italy) and Turkey. Afterwards a Roumanian commissioner was added, and the general work of

this body was successful. It is revived by the treaty but with the difference that, provisionally, only Great Britain, France, Italy, and Roumania are to be represented. For the time being those of the bordering states which were allies of Germany are excluded, but it is evidently intended that ultimately this commission shall conform to the model of those for the Elbe, Oder and Niemen, which indeed are based on its own earlier constitution. The Rhine and the Moselle had, from 1868, a commission with no representatives except those of the bordering states. To these also are now added French, Dutch, Swiss, British, Italian and Belgian commissioners.

Like the rivers, the Kiel Canal is to be open on equal terms to all nations at peace with Germany. The new state of Czecho-Slovakia, besides its voice in the regulation of traffic on the Oder, gets an outlet to the sea of the same kind that Poland has in Danzig, though on a less generous scale. "In the ports of Hamburg and Stettin, Germany shall lease to the Czecho-Slovak State, for a period of ninety-nine years, areas which shall be placed under the general régime of free zones, and shall be used for the direct transit of goods coming from or going to that state." Lastly, on the railways, as on the

rivers, equality is elaborately provided for, and Germany agrees to co-operate in establishing through express trains and through tickets. The technical details in the treaty itself swell these provisions to a considerable size, and, obviously, their practical application will be preceded by numerous bulky volumes of official decisions.

The most cursory examination of these clauses shows that they are not meant to give a full and final settlement. Some of them are

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explicitly "provisional." others are not reciprocal and therefore have that penal character which belongs

to a great part of the treaty and which, however long it lasts, must sooner or later come to an end. Others make no reference to the third parties, the neutrals of the war, whose interests are not less involved than those of the belligerents. Others again have indications in them of the other spirit which alternates so oddly in the treaty with its penal intentions, the spirit which led to the founding of the League of Nations. It is left to the League to apply the principle of "internationalisation" to the River Niemen, to decide disputes over any of the articles on ports, waterways, and railways, to recommend the revision of any of

the articles which relate to a "permanent administrative régime." After five years the Council of the League may modify certain of the general provisions, including the clauses on tariffs and the use of ports, the restrictions on Germany's right to carry passengers or goods by regular services between the ports of any allied or associated power without special permission, the concession of favoured treatment on German railways for goods coming from the allied and associated countries and German goods specially designated by these powers which are on their way to their territories. Even the clauses on through trains, through tickets, and emigrants are liable to this revision. Failing such revision, no allied or associate power can claim, after the five years, the benefit of any of these articles except for parts of its territories in which reciprocity in these respects is accorded. The period of five years in which reciprocity cannot be demanded may be prolonged by the League of Nations, but, even if it is prolonged, the intention obviously is that it should have an end. There is to be this limited period in which German communications are to be laid open on favourable terms to the allies, and, after it, is to come either the grant of reciprocity by the allies, or the legitimate refusal

by Germany to continue this special favour, or reciprocity in some respects for some countries with the return of old restrictions in other respects for other countries. The part which the League of Nations is to play is not prescribed very definitely, nor would it have been possible to lay it down with much more clearness. It is certain that the League will have a department of communications, and that through this department will pass a great number of papers relating to the execution and revision of these clauses ; beyond this, everything depends on the general progress of the League.

The provisions of the peace treaty show in an extreme degree the baffling combination that has already appeared in other examples of the political regulation of communications, the combination of greater freedom of movement for some, with its price of restricted movement for other nations. Confessedly they impose restrictions more severe than are intended to last, but they leave open the question whether there is to be substituted for them a renewal of mutual exclusion or a general opening of barriers. There are few more important issues to

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be decided in the long future of Europe. An abstract thinker who set himself the question how the means of international communication could best be made to serve the interests of mankind, would undoubtedly conclude that they ought to be made to serve all men according to some principle of justice. He would think out a universal plan like the rationing of nations which was conducted, on a scale comparatively small, by the Supreme Economic Council after the end of the war. Admitting that, for a long time to come, there will not be plenty of all goods for the whole human race, he would try to devise some principle of fairness by which each community could be given what the world could afford towards satisfying its needs. He would condemn every interference with this principle, every force which controlled the means of communication, material and ideal, for another end. These means he would regard as morally the common property of the whole world. His point of view would differ from that of the politics and business of every day, as that of the kings and ministers who gave roads and railways to their peoples differed from that of the old freeholders or toll-owners or robber-barons. Within each country nowadays almost all the roads are

open and free for every kind of traffic, the turn-pike gates have been lifted off their hinges and the bagman no longer puts his horse to a gallop when he passes by a wood. That is the result of a long history of will and wisdom. What made our highways safe and cheap was, most of all, the fact that they were the king's highways, that the officers of law and order watched over them. The beginnings of a similar history can be traced in the progress towards the security and open use of international routes, in the suppression of pirates, the fair treatment of traders, and all the international agreements by which intercourse is promoted. As yet, however, these are only beginnings and they are very small in comparison with the abstract ideal of international communication. They have been made by the generous activity of separate nations or separate groups of men, helped out occasionally by the common action of the states. If they are to be carried towards completion, that common action must become regular and uninterrupted, a common authority must do the work which the states cannot compass, and, to do it, must command a loyalty even more devoted than that which is now given to the states. Fortunately the prospect of this

does not depend upon any single and sudden choice ; if such an authority comes it will come by a gradual increase of acquiescence and support, and these will be given it, one handful at a time, as men see that it is doing its work justly and well. An organ has been constituted, under the name of the League of Nations, through which the states have undertaken to begin this work. It rests with the public opinion of the world, first to determine how far it is to succeed, and then to behave to it as its success shall have deserved.

Besides its functions under the peace treaty, there is another and even more familiar point of

Practicability of International Organisation.	contact between the League and the problem of communications. Ever since it first became clear that the world was governed by the sovereign states, that is to say since the six-
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teenth century, a succession of writers have made projects for the erection of some common authority which should put an end to the "state of nature," the absence of binding law, between these states. Many of them made little impression at the time when they were written, and most of the few students who knew them a generation ago were apt to think of them as eccentric by-products of

the more solid and measurable growth of public international law. In the twentieth century the apprehension of impending war, and afterwards the catastrophe itself, caused them to be reprinted and studied afresh, and they are now customarily summarised in the earlier pages of a good many books which expound the constitution of the League of Nations. The place that has been given them, probably a place of unmerited prominence, is that of forerunners of this world-embracing plan, and their authors are not uncommonly regarded as having prophetically explained, in the slow old world, principles which have been brought into the sphere of practical politics by the modern changes in communications. A century ago, the state of communications was indeed an obstacle to international organisation. It is not difficult to find passages in writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in which the wide dispersion of states is shown to be an insuperable bar to the founding of any common standing assembly even for consultation. Burke thought it fatal to any organic union even of Great Britain and the American colonies. "You will now, Sir, perhaps imagine," he said in one of his most celebrated speeches in 1775, "that I am on the point of

proposing to you a scheme for a representation of the colonies in Parliament. Perhaps I might be inclined to entertain some such thought ; but a great flood stops me in my course. *Opposuit natura*—I cannot remove the eternal barriers of the creation.” To all intents and purposes this barrier has been removed ; it was not eternal. On the face of it, it seems that this no longer stands in the way of international organisation. It has become comparatively very easy to summon a meeting of representatives from many different countries, and easy for these representatives to send prompt and full reports or enquiries to their governments, or to go away to confer with their governments in person. The journeys of British ministers and officials by aeroplane to the Paris Conference, the frequent continental journeys of Mr. Lloyd George and the European labours of General Smuts and Mr. W. M. Hughes, not to mention President Wilson, have shown what a great change has been made in this respect by the improved technique of travelling, whilst the less conspicuous change made by the improved technique of sending messages is in reality greater still.

There will be nothing novel in this aspect of

the first meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations. It will mark merely a short further step in the long development of the machinery of diplomacy. There was a time when the nations had no standing diplomacy at all, nothing but intermittent missions for special purposes, which went home as soon as their simple business was completed. Foreign ambassadors were unwelcome and distrusted visitors. As the modern system of states developed, they began one by one to harbour and to send out to their neighbours permanent representatives who dealt with the growing and more varied mass of international business. Not long after this had become the regular practice of the greater states it began to be supplemented by another kind of machinery, the congress or conference. Some diplomatic questions involved too many parties and too many knotty points to be settled by separate negotiations between each state and each other ; it was necessary to assemble plenipotentiaries from all of them in the same place and to form them into a body for the purpose of discussion, though not, it is true, for the purpose of deciding by a majority vote. In 1648 the great Congress of Westphalia,

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in which all the great states from the Gulf of Finland to the Straits of Gibraltar were represented, made a profound impression on men's minds, as have done all the scores of peace conferences and congresses of allies in subsequent times. The minor meetings about small practical questions like posts and telegraphs, or the safety of ships at sea are scarcely mentioned in books on general history, but they also came to do more and more in clearing away the ever-growing piles of international *agenda*, and some of them reached the stage of permanence before it was possible to set up permanent international bodies for the greater matters. In 1914, when the outbreak of war smashed in pieces all the existing universal institutions, there were already many of these to enumerate: four connected with navigation, on the Danube, the Congo, the Suez Canal, and on safety at sea; three with sanitation, on the Lower Danube, in Constantinople and in Alexandria; three with finance, those for Turkey, Egypt and Greece, and several to circulate information on particular matters like that seated at Brussels, created by the Sugar Convention of 1902. Merely to carry out efficiently their very limited functions, these bodies had become permanent, just as the ambassadors

had become permanent four hundred years or so before. The same causes which brought about these results were still operating with increasing force, leading to the creation of innumerable new international organs and availing themselves of all the new expedients for forming international opinions, agreements, understandings, compromises, decisions. During the war the combination of the allied and associated powers made a fuller use of all these means and threw an incalculably greater strain on them than any previous alliance or union of states. They were thoroughly tested, and they proved themselves fit to do what was demanded of them, even in spite of the enemy. So clear was this that public opinion unconsciously accepted it as a fact ; among all the multitudinous critics of the League of Nations, it is doubtful if a single one has disparaged it on the ground that while the ocean rolls and the land divides it, the spokesmen of all mankind can never be brought to one table together.

There is more, however, to be said about the effect of the technique of communications on international or supra-national institutions. A member of the Council or the Assembly of the League does not stand in the same relation to his

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fellow-countrymen as that of a parish-councillor to his neighbours, or a member of parliament to his constituents, any more than Mr. Selfridge, sitting with his telephones and electric bells, holds the same relation to his customers as the village grocer who cuts them a pound of cheese with a knife. If the League of Nations is to be explained as one step in a long process, from international chaos towards a unified government of the world, it must always be remembered that this government would be something utterly different from any government that has hitherto been known. In so far as it is based on the devices which have made it possible, it is bound to have certain limitations, and also certain special requirements and special dangers, by all of which it will be made unlike the old known forms of government. Experience in other spheres has already shown what some of these will be, and it is worth while to examine any indications that can be found.

The first place to search is the old diplomacy. From an early date in the development of the modern conditions, those who were responsible for the organisation of the British diplomatic service began to enquire how the new inventions

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were affecting the diplomatists and their work. It is fortunate that they did so, because on a point like this it would be almost impossible to form a sound opinion without passing in review a number of independent statements by men of judgment and experience who were themselves engaged in diplomacy as the changes occurred. Except for the official enquiries few such statements would have existed. Of the others that are now accessible in print, perhaps the best known is that of Lord Newton, who, in his *Lord Lyons*, says : " In after years Lord Lyons frequently expressed the opinion that if there had then been telegraphic communication across the Atlantic it would have been impossible to avert war " between England and the Northern States over the difficulties raised by the American Civil War. The ground of this was the fact that an ambassador three or four weeks, or even three or four days, away from his government must have more independence, more of a free hand, than one whose dispatches are answered immediately by cable. In Lord Lyons's case, the ambassador being pacific, independence meant the preservation of peace. Sir Andrew Buchanan, in 1861, said that the adoption of telegraphic communications " reduces to a great degree the

responsibility of the minister, for he can now ask for instructions instead of doing a thing upon his own responsibility ; but at the same time it very often happens that he cannot get an answer in time, and that the instructions arrive after he has been obliged to act." A man of autocratic temper like Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, might be reluctant to admit that the calling of a diplomatist, in which he had spent his active life, had so far declined ; but it seems on the whole that the weight of testimony is against him. The diplomacy of each nation had been very largely centralised in its foreign office, and this has had the same kind of effect as the centralisation of the internal governments of the nations. It subjects the whole to a greater uniformity of purpose ; it frees it from the danger of the unruly part, and, since there were times when intractable diplomatists contributed to bring wars about, it may be said, to that extent, to eliminate one of the causes of unnecessary wars. That, however, is only one of its effects ; it also contributes to the general magnifying of the shocks and accidents of international relations which we have already had twice to notice. The more business is concentrated in the centres of diplomacy, the governments, and

withdrawn from the outposts, the more sensitive do those centres become to disturbances which are originally remote. A cabinet and a foreign office are sometimes more easily influenced by public opinion than an ambassador, and more likely to form rash and ignorant judgments. They are unable to consider local affairs in isolation, and must treat them as elements in the relations of the great powers all over the world. A "super-state," or governing organ for the whole world, using the same new means of communication, would be liable to the same dangers in an even greater degree. The greater the agreement and the unity of purpose at its centre, the less would be the sympathy and harmony between the centre and the outlying territories, unless care and forethought were exercised in sparing the susceptibilities of the governed.

Thus the task of regulating communications on a principle of universal fairness would have to be undertaken not in a spirit of opposition to the sentiment of nationality, but, so far as possible, as a supplement to the work which nationality now does. It must never be forgotten that the tendency to greater units, whether in politics or economics or in the communities of purely social and

intellectual life, is not necessarily altogether good. Just as there is a great deal to be said for the small shop-keeper against the big modern store, for the village against the big modern city, for the small and simple country against the "great state," so there will always be a case against the universal state. It is bound to bring with it, if it ever comes, a weakening of some of the valuable elements in life, and its success must depend on its avoidance of weakening too many or too much. Its advantages are primarily the advantages of good organisation, but it will be exposed to the temptation, which always besets the organiser, of trampling on freedom and over-riding the intimate prejudices which, if they make men conservative and mutually distrustful, give them also energy and self-respect. It has been said that at present only a nation can give a man a soul. Any phrase so general must be ambiguous, and, if this means that a man who considers all nations equally has less of a soul than one who can think of only one, it is untrue. If it is taken in a narrower sense, it is both true and important: no political project can succeed which is not based on the fact that a great proportion of civilised men are willing to make greater sacrifices for the nation than for any other end, because they

believe that, without the welfare of the nation, they could have no good life.

Another kind of guidance can be found in the history of the international institutions or socia-

tions of which the basis is voluntary,
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Church, the various international federations of trade-unions or other "labour" organisations," of students of particular subjects, like the periodical congresses of historians or orientalist or "Americanists," and any others who form bodies to meet and transact business, coming from different countries. These associations, as has often been pointed out, differ from states because membership in them is, broadly speaking, by the free choice of the members, and because each of them has a special purpose, instead of being, like the states, ready to deal with any kind of matter that may need attention. Some of them sprang up by the coalescence of associations of the same kind within the separate national boundaries, like the various international federations of trade unions, and these, as they grow in strength and in the amount of work that falls to the , tend to go through stages similar to those of the international organs of political

diplomacy. In the early days of the labour movement there were visits of roving trade-unionists to gatherings of foreign "comrades"; in 1864 came the old International; in the 'eighties and 'nineties there were special international congresses; in 1910 the new International formed its permanent bureau at Brussels, and thus entered on the stage of having a fixed international organ like the standing commission of the Sugar Convention. Others of the voluntary international bodies began not by the union of component parts from several countries, but by the propagation of an idea that was essentially international and could not have existed at all within the bounds of a single country. The readiest example is that of the international languages like Esperanto, which would have been absurd if no one had learnt it except the Finns or the Portuguese. There were several about the objects of which it would be very hard to say anything more definite than that they were to further "internationalism" in general, any and every kind of intercourse that passed between nations. The "International Intermediary Institute," for instance, of which the seat is the Hague, has for its object "to supply information in the widest sense on all questions of international

importance not bearing a personal or secret character, either on international, Dutch and foreign law, or on economic and statistical data and commercial policy. Such information is supplied free of charge, except . . . to defray expenditure unavoidable in a particular case." Here, of course, the main object is really commercial, but there are other, though perhaps somewhat frivolous, associations which, with the same wide scope, have no practical purpose whatever.

If one had, however, the patience to enquire into all the scores of international associations which, according to the books of reference flourished in the year 1914, it would pretty certainly appear that the greater part of them belonged to neither of these classes. Neither the essentially international motives nor the motives of promoting, by foreign aid and counsel, a cause that might have had a restricted national basis were often found in an undiluted form. In most of these bodies they were so well fused together that it is hard to say where each begins and where the other ends. The catholicity of a church is one of the attributes that make the believer think its sacraments efficacious, the sense of cosmopolitan comradeship is one of the driving forces of socialism on a

provincial borough council, while the successes of a cause like women's suffrage or prohibition or proportional representation in foreign countries are always used as arguments in their favour. Joint action between representatives of different nations, even when each of them only wants to bring about a change in his own country, begets an international way of thinking and working. In so far as a man is a Catholic or a Socialist or an advocate of "women's rights," he must look at things from a point of view which is not national. This kind of intercourse does what general intercourse between nations often fails to do : it makes all men equally friends if only they are friends of the cause.

Here comes in again the great difference between the states and the voluntary associations. What makes possible the growth of an international spirit in these latter is the simplicity of their purposes ; what makes it slow and doubtful in politics is the obscurity and complexity of the purposes of the state. Although the institutions of marriage and democracy are by no means the same in all the countries of Europe, they are sufficiently uniform to allow the rise of an international movement for "wome 's ri hts." The moveme t is, however, necessarily confi ed to

countries which are, more or less, monogamous, and, more or less, constitutional. There are few political movements which can find so many countries from which to draw support. For the most part, the proposals of reformers are applicable only to their own countries, and often, when they try to recommend them abroad, they find that the existing institutions and past history make them useless or impossible. No case could be more instructive than that of the proposals for disarmament after the last war. England, for a long time past, has had a professional standing army and those Englishmen who wanted a larger army, were advocates of conscription. Mr. Lloyd George and many other Englishmen, especially of the labour party, thought that the way to reduce armaments in European countries like France and Germany,

in England, was to abandon conscription, to let the working man go home freed from military control, and to rely for police and military defence on a small body of mercenaries. The French labour leaders were astonished and dismayed by this plan. To them a standing army appeared to be, what it has always been in their history, and what it was in the English history of the seventeenth century, a fit instrument for a *co p d'état*, or for

the oppression of an oligarchy or a despot. Their way of making France safe for democracy was to have a conscript army in which every citizen was to be a soldier, but, by the same token, every soldier was to be first of all a citizen. So difficult is it to get a common policy even between two neighbouring democracies and even for the promotion of international peace. So much the more is the need in any international political organ for a firm basis of knowledge and of deference to the characters and wishes of the nations. So much greater is the effort that will be necessary to bring into being a world-wide consciousness of common interest, and a world-wide loyalty to the same sovereign body.

It is time to sum up an argument which, by endeavouring to consider all the sides of this difficult subject, is beginning to
Conclusion . blur the outlines and to provoke more doubts than it can settle. We started from a survey of the facts of the modern changes in means of communication, material and ideal, and drew from these facts the conclusion that these changes had contributed essential elements to the industrial civilisation which now exists in the politically dominant countries of the world. We

saw that a serious interruption of these communications leads to great evils and endangers the whole structure of economic and social life, and that, while this is true of communications in general, it has been, and is still, becoming increasingly true of international communications. Passing on to consider the part played by states in developing the mechanism of intercourse between nations, we found that, although war primarily divides and obstructs, it favours the progress of invention and the manufacture of instruments of movement. In peaceful relations, we found that the states had played a less decisive part in opening up communications, that the production and ownership of the means for them had been left for the most part in private hands, subject to a fitful political control of which the aim was sometimes to advance and sometimes to retard the exchange of goods and persons and ideas between the nations. We saw that such common action as had been taken by groups of states had been done until very recently with an almost obsolete organisation, of which the defects had, at least in some respects, been made more dangerous by the modern changes. On the other hand, we saw that an attempt has been begun to construct a new

organisation which, making use of all the new methods, is to endeavour to solve both the old problems and the still greater new problems which must be solved unless the civilisation we know is to be destroyed.

Broadly, the whole argument may be said to illustrate a gloomy judgment which has often been passed on the world that has been made by the industrial revolution, namely that it has fashioned for itself the most marvellous tools that have ever been seen, but that, instead of using them for its service, it has let them rule it. The gigantic machinery of communications, of which we have tried to indicate the size and complexity and cost, is essentially an instrument ; but an instrument is nothing apart from its purpose, and here the purpose is unknown or misunderstood or neglected or perverted. We try to use this elaborate creation of ours like children, who play with a gold watch to see it go, but not to tell the time, or like savages, who break up a mariner's compass to make jewels for their hair and tips for their arrows. The machine is too heavy for the game to be safe. We are none the happier now that our prayer has been answered and the gods have annihilated space and time.

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